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ABSTRACT: In this article, I focus on three issues in Francisco Suárez’s account of the separated soul:
the status of the separated soul as a person, the separated soul’s knowledge of itself, and the question
of the soul’s nature both as form of the body and as existing outside the body. I place his discussion
in dialogue with St. Thomas Aquinas and Cajetan (Thomas de Vio) and show the ways he departs from
those two thinkers. Finally, I show that his account of these problems makes for a philosophically probable account of the resurrection of the body.
Key words: Francisco Suárez; Thomas Aquinas; Cajetan; separated soul; resurrection of the body;
immortality of the soul; sensory knowledge.

Algunos temas en la teoría de Suárez del alma separada
RESUMEN: En este artículo, me enfoco en las tres cuestiones de la teoría de Suárez del alma separada: el
estatus del alma separada como persona, el conocimiento de sí por parte del alma separada, y la cuestión
de la naturaleza del alma tanto como forma del cuerpo y como existiendo fuera del cuerpo. Sitúo su
discusión en diálogo con Santo Tomás de Aquino y Cayetano (Thomas de Vio) y expongo los aspectos en
que Suárez se diferencia de esos dos pensadores. Finalmente, demuestro cómo su presentación de estos
problemas da lugar a una versión filosóficamente probable de la resurrección del cuerpo.
Palabras clave: Francisco Suárez; Tomás de Aquino; Cayetano; alma separada; resurrección del
cuerpo; inmortalidad del alma; conocimiento sensible.

Every Scholastic philosopher must at some point come to terms with issues
surrounding the status of the human soul at death. Francisco Suárez, the
famous Renaissance Jesuit philosopher, is no exception. Early in his career,
he wrote, but never published, a long Commentary on the De anima1. Here, I
Este artículo se enmarca dentro del Proyecto I+D+I «Pensamiento y tradición jesuita
y su influencia en la Modernidad desde las perspectivas de la Historia, la Traductología y la
Filosofía Jurídica, Moral y Política» (PEMOSJ), financiado por el Ministerio de Economía
y Competitividad del Gobierno de España y el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional
(MINECO/FEDER) (referencia FFI2015-64451-R), y cuyo investigador principal es el Prof.
Dr. Juan Antonio Senent de Frutos
1
Suárez’s Commentaria una cum questionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima is the
result of his early teaching assignment at Segovia in 1572. It was never published in his
lifetime, although he did undertake revising it late in his life. The printed edition in his Opera
Omnia, reflects some of his revisions, but also the heavy editorial hand of Baltasar Alvarez.
More recently, Salvador Castellote has published a critical edition of the early, unrevised,
manuscripts of the Commentary. It is this work that I cite below. The publishing history of
Suárez’s works is usefully surveyed in Solana, M., Historia de la filosofia española, época del
Renacimiento, Madrid, Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, 1941, vol. 3, pp. 333-340. The
Commentary text I use is that edited by Salvador Castellote, 3 vols, Madrid, Sociedad de
Estudios y Publicationes [vols. 1 and 2] and Madrid, Fundación Xavier Zubiri [vol. 3], 19781991. The discussion of the separated soul occurs in volume 3. I will abbreviate this work as
CDA and will refer to it by disputation, question, and section number.
*
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want to consider this early work as providing an opportunity to watch Suárez,
in the role of philosopher, discuss the difficulties inherent in the status of the
separated soul. As part of a much longer work, his Disputation dedicated to
treating the separated, soul is best seen as continuous with the broader context
of his development of an account of human nature. Of course, I cannot treat
all the issues that arise in the discussion of the separated soul, but instead I
will focus on three particularly acute problems for a Scholastic philosopher:
the status of the separated soul as a person, the separated soul’s knowledge
of itself, and the question of the soul’s nature relative to its status in the body
and outside the body. I will conclude the paper by arguing that these three
features of his account cohere and provide the foundation for a philosophical,
not theological, understanding of the resurrection of the body.
As we shall see, Suárez is not afraid to deviate from his precursors
on important issues, but his discussion always tries to make sense of the
motivations of the tradition of Scholastic thought. Most notable for the topic
at hand is his attempt to inscribe a kind of personhood, or personality, within
the soul alone. This is a significant departure from Thomas Aquinas, and once
he makes this move, the other traditional topics he addresses take on new
dimensions. Also important will be the way that his contributions to the topic
are shaped decisively by other philosophical commitments he has, especially
those related to intellectual cognition.
1. The Separated Soul as Semi-person
Suárez holds that at death the destruction of the «real union» (realis unio)
of body and soul occurs2. Despite the rather ominous overtones of that claim,
it is important to note that this is all he thinks happens to the soul at death. In
fact, this claim is provided in the context of an objection to the effect that on his
account nothing is corrupted at the death of a human being. What is it about
his account of the relation between soul and body that makes it necessary for
Suárez to reply that there is some corruption or destruction of the human
being at death? Although I do not have space to set forth in any detail Suárez’s
account of the relation between soul and body, both separately and as really
united, in a prelude to his discussion of the separated soul he helpfully provides
us with a précis. It begins: «Even when it is united to the body, the human soul
subsists with a partial spiritual subsistence, which is identified with the soul;
the matter subsists partially as well»3.
Here Suárez commits himself to the position that the human being consists
of two partially subsistent existents: a soul and a body. For our purposes, it will
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 1, n. 6, vol. 3: p. 452.
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 1, n. 2, vol. 3: p. 446: «Suppono primo quod anima nostra
etiam in corpore subsistit partiali subsistentia spirituali, quae illi identificatur; et etiam
material partialiter subsistit».
2
3
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be sufficient to discuss the status of the partially subsistent soul. Suárez sets
forth his view as an alternative to one supported by Cajetan. Cajetan holds that
the soul after death can be called a «semi-person» while before death it cannot
be so described4. According to Cajetan, a full account of human nature includes
«personality» by which he means that which provides a human being with
their subsistent nature. Since a human being is one, the soul cannot be said to
subsist when it is united to the body. That is, Cajetan’s primary concern is to
preserve the unity of the human person by de-emphasizing the subsistent status
of the soul when it is united to the body5. However, that rejection of the soul’s
subsistent status raises a problem for him in reference to the separated soul
insofar as its subsistence is precisely what would make it capable of continuing
existence after death. He finds an answer to this problem in asserting that at
death the human soul begins to subsist. Indeed, a proper entity results at death,
and this entity, although not a complete nature, can be described nonetheless
as a «person», or, more accurately, a «semi-person». Of course, submerged in
the background of this entire discussion is a definition of «person» with deep
medieval roots, which Suárez defines, paraphrasing Boethius, as «an individual
substance of an entire rational nature»6. For Cajetan, then, the soul by itself
when united to a body cannot be considered a person because it is not an
individual substance, but once separated it takes on a new sort of identity in
becoming a «semi-person».
Suárez finds Cajetan’s discussion «displeasing in many ways». It is in spelling
out this displeasure that Suárez provides us with his account of the subsistence
of the soul. The central point that Suárez wants to make is that death has no
effect on the essence of the soul, but only changes its mode of existence7. While
we will consider some of the effects that result from this change in mode of
existence soon, for now I want to focus on the lack of change that occurs. What
stays the same in the transition from one mode of existence to another? The
answer, of course, is the subsistent soul. The soul, even when it exists in the body
exists essentially (per se). Or, putting the point another way, the soul existing
in the body does not receive support (substentata) from another. In fact, this is
precisely the distinguishing feature of humans from all other living things:
Cajetan’s (Thomas De Vio) discussion occurs in his commentary on Thomas Aquinas’s
Summa theologiae at q. 88, a. 2 of the prima pars. This work can be found in the Leonine
edition of Aquinas’s Summa theologiae. I use this edition for the text of Aquinas, as well. I
abbreviate references to the Summa theologiae as STh, followed by part, question, and article.
5
Of course, Cajetan’s position conflicts with that of Thomas Aquinas on this issue. The
latter held that the human soul was subsistent even when united to the body. For Thomas
Aquinas’s account, see, STh, I, q. 75, a. 2. Cajetan’s rejection of the subsistence of the soul
perhaps speaks to the influence of various Italian Renaissance philosophers.
6
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 1, n. 5, vol. 3: 450. For the Boethian background, see the helpful
overview provided by J. Marenbon, Boethius, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 70-76
7
This position is, of course, that of Thomas Aquinas. See, for example, STh I, q. 89, a. 1.
4
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…in other living things, their souls do not subsist, but they are certain dispositions (affectiones) attached to (affixae) matter. Their subsistence is grounded and begun chiefly (potissime) in matter, but it is completed through the
action of form. However, in human beings, even though a human being is
what especially (praecipue) subsists, nonetheless this subsistence is due especially to the soul, which is united to a body not as if it were receiving support
from the body, but rather as using it as a conjoined instrument. For to subsist
is only to exist essentially (per se), independent of receiving support from
another. For this reason, the subsistence of a human being is more perfect
than that of other composite beings, for a human being is completed from
two subsistent parts, while others are not8.

It follows from this view of the soul as subsistent even when united to the
body that there is no reason to suppose, contrary to Cajetan, that the soul
undergoes any essential change at death. The soul does not become a semiperson because, in effect, it was already a semi-person when united to the
body as part of the whole subsistent person. It might be asked why Suárez
rejects calling the human soul itself a person. If it is subsistent and has some
degree of personality, why can one not simply say it is a person? One feature
of personality, he reminds us, is that it is incommunicable. However, the
personality of the soul is clearly communicable to a body, so it remains more
precise to call the soul a semi-person, no matter how problematic that appears
at first9. We can say, then, that Suárez agrees with Thomas Aquinas and Cajetan
that while united to the body, «I am not my soul»10. However, he could not say
that without qualification. In fact, part of me is my soul and that part of me
clearly survives its separation from the body.
While calling the soul a «semi-person» may sound a bit problematic, it
actually does quite a bit of philosophical work for Suárez. I suspect that part
of his motivation must lie in the worry that the separated soul must be in some
sense continuous in self-knowledge as the soul united to the body. After all,
if the only substance that can be called a person is the subsistent individual
constituted by the formal unity of soul and body, then it is not the case that the
8
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 1, n. 2, vol. 3: p.446: «…in aliis eorum animae non subsistent,
sed sunt affectiones quaedam materiae affixae et subsistentia illorum viventium in materia
potissime fundatur et inchoatur, completur vero per actuationem formae. At in homine, licet
quod praecipue subsistit, sit homo, tamen haec subsistentia praecipue est ratione animae,
quae unitur corpori, non ut substentetur ab illo, sed potius ut utatur illo ut instrumento
coniuncto. Subsistere enim tantum est per se esse independens ab alio substentante. Et
hinc est quod subsistentia hominis est perfectior quam aliorum compositorum. Haec enim
completur ex duabus partibus subsistentibus, illa vero non».
9
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 1, n. 5, vol. 3: p. 450.
10
The famous passage in Aquinas occurs at In I Cor., ch, 15, lectio 2. Perhaps Thomas’s
most radical statement on this topic occurs at STh I, q. 75, a. 4, ad 2 where he states that the
soul is no more a person than a hand or foot. For a helpful overview, see Still, C. N.,«Do We
Know All After Death? Thomas Aquinas on the Disembodied Soul’s Knowledge,» in Bauer, M.
(ed.), Person, Soul, and Immortality, New York: American Catholic Philosophical Association,
2002, pp. 107-119.

PENSAMIENTO, vol. 74 (2018), núm. 279

pp. 63-74

J. B. South, Some Themes in Suárez’s Account of the Separated Soul

67

person survives death, even if the soul does. Suárez’s recognition that the soul
of itself is a semi-person allows him to reject the apparently Thomistic position
that there is no middle ground between my existing and my not existing. Indeed,
there is a middle ground: the semi-personhood of the soul exhibiting continuity
before and after death11.
Despite the philosophical advantage provided by introducing semipersonhood into the discussion of the soul, it raises more strongly another
problem. If the soul, even when united to a body, has semi-personhood in
addition to subsistence, it renders even more forceful a worry about why
the soul is embodied in the first place. In other words, it is legitimate to ask
whether it is more natural for the soul to exist outside the body than in the
body, and the introduction of semi-personhood complicates the answer to that
question. Indeed, answering this question turns out to be quite difficult for
both a methodological reason and substantive reasons. The methodological
reason involves what a philosopher can assert about this issue. As noted
above, Suárez is quite careful throughout his discussion to demarcate clearly
the answers to questions that we know through faith alone and not through
unaided reason. So, in this case, Suárez is careful to answer primarily in terms
that would make sense to an Aristotelian philosopher. The substantive reasons
are doctrinal and depend upon commitments he has to particular issues, most
notably concerning the separated soul’s knowledge of itself. Accordingly, before
we can be in a position to grasp his answer to the naturalness of the soul’s
status outside the body, we have to grasp first what he says about the activities
of the separated soul.
2. The Separated Soul’s Knowledge of Itself
St. Thomas Aquinas asserted that the separated soul knows itself through
itself: «But when it is separated from the body, it no longer understands by
conversion to phantasms, but by turning to things that are intelligible in
themselves. So, in that state, it understands itself through itself»12. This
statement is not transparent, since many commentators take the «intelligible
in itself» to refer to intelligible species, infused by God into the separated
soul. Strikingly, this is not how Suárez reads the passage. Suárez takes the
«intelligible in itself» to refer to the soul. As this is not a paper on Thomas
Aquinas, I will avoid taking a stand on whether Suárez reads Aquinas correctly.
11
Robert Pasnau states the problem in this way. He argues that Aquinas needs such
a middle ground, even if he does not himself recognize such a middle ground. One way
to read Suárez’s account of semi-personhood is to recognize that it is filling this alleged
gap in Aquinas’s position. See Pasnau, R., Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 387-388.
12
STh 1, q. 89, a. 2: «Sed cum fuerit a corpore separata, intelliget non convertendo se
ad phantasmata, sed ad ea quae sunt secundum se intelligibilia, unde seipsam per seipsam
intelligent».
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In what follows, I will identify the view that the soul knows itself through itself
without a species as that of Aquinas in order to render clearer the dialogic
nature of Suárez’s response.
Suárez begins by noting that St. Thomas’s position is «difficult» (difficilis)
since our intellect exists in pure potency and is not raised to the first level of act
by itself. In other words, for the intellect to know anything, something other
than itself must actualize it. Of course, this is quite standard Aristotelianism
and is affirmed by Thomas Aquinas13. So, the difficulty is the fact that there
must be some sort of mechanism, some sort of actuality, which moves the
purely potential intellect to first act. That suggests that some sort of intelligible
species is needed to do that job14.
Suárez proceeds to provide additional arguments that a species is needed
for the separated soul to know itself. We have already seen that the essence of
the soul does not change when it is separated, only its mode of being changes.
That being the case, Suárez argues that if the soul is constituted to know itself
without a species when it is separated, it is also thus constituted when united
to a body. After all, when in the body, the intellect only needs the cooperation of
the senses to render it actual so that it can know. If it is already rendered actual
to know itself, it ought to be able to know itself while in the body. Moreover,
one cannot have recourse to the fact that by being separated from the body,
the intellect is thereby constituted in first act to know itself, since the mere fact
that the soul is separated from the body does not mean that it can understand
something that it could not understand while united to a body. Even if one
said that the status of the separated soul removed some impediment from the
intellect, Suárez can find no suitable candidate for such an impediment. After
all, if the soul could know itself through itself, it could do so in the body as well,
especially given that being united to a body is its natural state15.
In short, then, Suárez is pressing the following objection: if the separated
soul could know itself through itself when separated, it would be able to know
itself through itself when united to the body. However, it does not know itself
through itself when united to a body; therefore, it needs to be raised to first act
by something other than itself in order to know itself, both when united to the
body and when separated from it. The key point of support has already been
mentioned: the soul remains essentially the same whether it is united to a body
or separated from it. Moreover, that means that the intelligibility intrinsic to
the soul is the same whether it is united to a body of separated from it, since
intelligibility follows nature. A mere change in the mode of existence will have
no effect on intelligibility16.
At this point, Suárez raises one more argument in support of the soul’s
knowledge of itself through itself. And, in fact, this argument complicates his
13
14
15
16

See, for example, STh I, q. 79, a. 2 and STh I, q. 87. a. 1.
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 5, n. 2: vol. 3: 480.
Ibid.
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 5, n. 3, vol. 3: p. 482.
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story enormously. The argument to be considered involves another paradigm
instance of a separated substance, namely, angels. An angel knows itself
through its substance and does not need a species. Since a human soul shares
with an angel both intelligibility and subsistence, it ought to be able to know
itself in the same way an angel does17. It might be thought that to respond to
this objection adequately, Suárez must reject the basic analogy between angels
and human beings as intelligible and subsistent. However, his strategy is rather
different and involves distinguishing two ways in which an angel might be said
to know itself through itself.
It might be that an angel acts on its intellect through its substance and
concurs with the intellect in order to produce the act of intellection. However,
it might also be that an angel’s intellect flows from (dimanet) its essence as
constituted in first act in such a way that it can understand itself through itself.
Whichever way one might want to understand angelic self-cognition, neither
of these ways is suitable to the separated human soul due to its status as the
lowest of spiritual beings. That is, Suárez rejects the ontological similarity that
would have to exist if human self-cognition occurred as angelic self-cognition
does. So, even though the human soul is both subsistent and separate, it is still
a human soul and its activities must be those that are suitable to humans, not
other types of separate and subsistent substances. As a result, even if an angelic
soul can concur with its intellect to directly produce an act of intellection, the
human soul cannot. The support for this claim is significant: the human soul
is imperfect to the degree that it is a true form of a body and does not have
the necessary immateriality to supply the nature (rationem) of an intelligible
species. That just means that the human soul is intelligible only potentially, not
actually, due to its low degree of immateriality, and thus something in addition
to the potential intelligibility of the soul is required for the soul to be intelligible
to its intellect. Moreover, it cannot be the case that the human soul is such that
its intellect flows from it constituted in first act. Now, Suárez does not want
to downplay the relation between the soul and its intellect—in the case of the
separated soul he admits that they are as conjoined as possible. However, he
compares this conjunction to the way in which light exists within vision yet is
not itself seen except reflectively and also to the way in which heat is present
within the organ of touch but is not itself sensed. In both cases, what is missing
is intentional presence, that is, the kind of presence that can be known. The
soul and its intellect may be conjoined, but however closely that may be, it will
never be an intentional conjunction18.
Suárez does make one significant concession in is discussion. The topic of
the soul’s self-knowledge is an obscure one. Hence, although the preceding
arguments are indeed probable, they are not evident. Accordingly, the opposite
position is probable as well, that is, the position advanced by St. Thomas Aquinas
17
18

Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 5, n. 4, vol. 3: p. 484.
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 5, n. 6, vol. 3: p. 486.
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that the separated soul knows itself through itself. In fact, given the weight of
authority behind it, one might want to believe this position instead19. At this
point, Suárez’s reader might be forgiven a bit of exasperation. I think, however,
that there is something a bit more subtle going on than mere deference to
authority. First, it is noteworthy that Suárez states that Aquinas’s position can
be believed (credi). That is simply not the kind of language he uses when stating
his own preferred option. Now, whether that is a rhetorical move to show us that
we should be proceeding with caution is unclear. What is clear, though, is the
way he describes the problem that Aquinas’s position must solve: the difficulty
of this opinion lies in explaining why it does not understand itself when in
the body or in explaining what separation confers on it to give it the ability to
know itself20. Accordingly, he points out that the issue is structurally similar to
the way that an angel knows itself through itself. That is, either the soul itself
concurs in the production of its knowledge of itself by actualizing the intellect,
or the intellect is just so constituted as to be able to produce this knowledge
from itself. Considering the first way, Suárez says it must be something about
the status of the soul when it is in the body that prevents it from doing the
work necessary to produce self-knowledge from itself. That is, there must be
something about the way that it informs the body. Suárez suggests that perhaps
the soul informs the body in the way that a material form does, not the way that
a substantial form does. Considering the second way, he states that it would be
the case that the intellect is constituted in first act for knowing the soul, but that
its connection with sense prevents it from actually knowing, that is, proceeding
to second act. Thus, while in the body, the intellect depends on sense in order
to have any cognition, and sense can never provide the necessary information
to intellect that would allow it to have distinct knowledge of the soul through
a proper concept. Suárez states an explicit preference for the second view, that
is, the one that holds that the intellect is constituted in first act for knowing the
soul, but is prevented from obtaining such knowledge as long as it must rely
on sense. His reason for this preference is that it coheres nicely with his own
views on the relation of sense to intellect and intellect’s dependence on sense,
although it raises an important issue (to be discussed in due time) concerning
why the intellect is impeded by the body21.
Now, Suárez’s treatment of Aquinas’s position accomplishes a couple of
tasks for him. First, it effectively eliminates the first reading that would make
the soul directly responsible for the intellect’s cognition. The crucial point is
that if this account were true, the soul would have to possess a different status
when informing the body (a material form) than when outside the body (a
substantial form). Now, in his discussion of the immortality of the soul, Suárez
comes close to claiming that, in effect, Aquinas is committed to the view that
19
20
21

Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 5, n. 6, vol. 3: p. 486.
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 5, n. 7, vol. 3: p. 486.
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 5, n. 7, vol. 3: p. 488.
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the soul is a material form22. By contrast, the lesson to be drawn from the
second more acceptable way of defending self-knowledge through itself alone
is that the relation between sense and intellect is a more complicated one than
is present in the Thomistic account. In both cases, the tasks accomplished
by the concession to Aquinas’s view are ones to which he has already drawn
the reader’s attention in this work. Moreover, for Aquinas’s position to be
acceptable, other portions of his thought will have to be jettisoned in favor of
Suárezian alternatives.

3.

The Naturalness of the Separated Soul

Suárez rejects another pivotal position in Aquinas’s account of the separated
soul, namely, that while it is more perfect in itself to know by turning to higher
intelligibles rather than through phantasms, nonetheless, it is more perfect for
the human soul to know through phantasms. Aquinas arrives at this conclusion
by stressing the proportionality between the intellect and the essences of
material things and adds that knowledge acquired other than by turning to
phantasms will be necessarily more confused insofar as it is disproportionate
to the cognitive powers of the human soul23. Suárez argues against this claim
in several ways. First, he maintains that the separated soul knows things that
the soul united to the body does not, e.g., itself in a direct way; second, it even
understands singular material things more fully than the soul that relies on
phantasms can. Moreover, in the case of knowledge acquired before death,
the separated soul understands better through it than it did when united to
the body. In the case of knowledge acquired after separation through infused
intelligible species, such species are themselves more proportioned to the soul
and more perfect. Finally, Suárez points out that it simply makes sense that
turning to what is more proportioned and more perfect will produce superior
understanding. In summary, Suárez appeals to the status of the separated soul
as freer (liberior) and existing without impediment (expeditius)24.
At first glance, it appears that Suárez is not really providing an argument
here, but simply a set of counter-assertions. What is missing is some central
claim or claims that would provide evidence for his positions. I think he
believes that he has such support in his more general account of intellectual
cognition, which he exhaustively discussed earlier in his Commentary. Two
features of his treatment on intellectual cognition make his argument here
22
Suárez discuses the topic of immortality at CDA, d. 2, q. 3 (vol. 1: 162-247). I
have discussed the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century background to Suárez’s discussion of
immortality in South, J., «Suarez, Immortality, and the Soul’s Dependence on the Body,»
in Hill, B. and Lagerlund, H. (eds.), The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2012, pp. 121-136.
23
STh I, q. 89, a. 1.
24
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 8, nn. 2-3, vol. 3: pp. 520-522.
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more plausible. First, he rejects Aquinas’s account of the proper object of the
human intellect. In place of the essence of material things abstracted from
phantasms, Suárez holds that the proper objects of the human intellect are
material singulars. That means that the intelligible species by which we know
do not represent some universal cognitional content, but a singular one25. So,
by acquiring new intelligible species, we would not be receiving species that
are too universal and disproportionate to the intellect. Those species would be
just like those we are used to from this life, representing singulars. Second, the
account of the relation between sense and intellect is quite different in the two
thinkers. While for Aquinas it might make perfect sense to say that the soul is
not freer or impeded when working with phantasms, such is not the case for
Suárez. He explicitly states that the body is an impediment to various cognitive
activities in this life, such as knowing clearly and distinctly the soul itself, its
operations, higher intellective substances, and God26. In addition, Suárez goes
to great lengths to show that the reliance on phantasms for the production of
intelligible species is not a causal one, but instead a merely concurrent one27.
Thus there is no reason, in principle, why intellectual knowledge cannot be
had just as well without phantasms; or, stated more strongly, Suárez thinks
there is good reason to hold that our knowledge of spiritual realities such as
the soul, angels, and God will be clearer and more distinct when the soul is
separated and is no longer bound by sense for the determination of cognitive
content. Given these considerations, Suárez’s position here amounts to a
rejection of Aquinas’s assertion that the separated soul’s mode of existence is
«preternatural» (praeternaturalis) or better, contrary to nature28.
Considerations of this sort, however, lead to a problem for Suárez. It now
looks like the soul united to the body is in worse shape than the separated
soul. That is, it might be thought that the state of the soul united to a body is
actually its «preternatural» state, that is, excessively imperfect and saturated
with impediments of various sorts. Suárez must tread carefully here, since he
rejects explicitly an account, which he traces back to Plato, holding that human
souls are not natural forms29. However, given the naturalness of the soul’s state
when separated from the body, it is hard to see how Suárez can consistently
hold that the mode of existence the soul has united to the body is a natural one.
Suárez’s response is quite nuanced. First, he in no way denies that the union
of soul and body is natural. After all, the soul is essentially a form and every form
25
Suárez argues for the direct and proper intellectual cognition of singulars at CDA, d.
IX, q. 3, vol. 3: pp. 106-152. I have discussed his arguments on behalf of direct and proper
cognition of singulars in «Singular and Universal in Suárez’s Account of Cognition,» The
Review of Metaphysics 55 (2002), pp. 785-823.
26
Suárez, CDA, d. IX, q. 5, n. 9, vol. 3: p. 176). The words «clearly (clare) and distinctly
(distincte)» are Suárez’s.
27
I discuss this issue in some detail in «Suárez on Imagination,» Vivarium 39 (2001),
pp. 119-158.
28
STh I, q. 89, a. 1.
29
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 9, n. 1, vol. 3: p. 524.
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naturally informs. Thus, the soul’s union with the body does not render the soul
imperfect, but rather the soul exhibits (explicat) its perfection by perfecting the
body30. In order to make his point, Suárez distinguishes between the extent of
the soul’s activities and the perfection of the soul’s activities. Clearly, the soul
performs a wider array of activities in the body than when separated. Yet, when
separated, it performs more perfect activities. Despite the more perfect activities
available to the separated soul, though, Suárez does not want to say that the
separated soul has a more natural status outside the soul. Instead, he invokes the
natural imperfection (imperfectio naturalis) of the soul, and couples that with the
claim that the natural end of the soul is to constitute the most perfect composite
creature among all creatures. It follows that the impediments that hinder the soul
while united to the body are indeed impediments, but are natural impediments,
not ones that are unnatural to it or that violate its nature31. In short, Suárez
displaces the locus of imperfection. Since he is unwilling to say that the soul’s
state apart from the body is contrary to nature, he builds the imperfection that
results from being united to a body into the very nature of the soul.
Suárez recognizes, though, that a bit more must be said. After all, it could easily
be objected that this natural state of affairs means that the soul is the unhappiest
of all forms informing bodies. Its potential is so great, yet its natural function
prohibits it from realizing that potential. It is worth considering, however, that
in fact the soul may be the happiest of forms that inform bodies since it both
performs more perfect operations while united to the body (e.g., intellection)
and yet when separated it has another mode of activity32. This strikes me a
very nice way of dealing with the problem given Suárez’s other philosophical
commitments. In its embodied knowing, the intellective soul is doing what any
form would do, as it were: constituting a composite along with its matter. At
the same time, given the fact that the separated soul can know just fine without
recourse to phantasms, it can still function in an intellectual way. Again, nothing
changes in the essence of the soul, but its different modes of existing complement
one another in such a way that the intellective soul is never frustrated.

4. Conclusion—The Resurrection of the Body
To conclude this paper, I want to pull all the pieces together and show how
they are used in Suárez’s discussion of the resurrection of the body. He begins
with what can only be considered a philosophical fantasy: the assumption that
the resurrection of the body is perfectly natural:
For it could be said that our soul advances from being imperfect to being
perfect. First, it would be natural for it to exist in a body in which for some
30
31
32

Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 9, nn. 2-3, vol. 3: p. 526.
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 9, n. 4, vol. 3: p. 528-530.
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 9, n. 4, vol. 3: p. 530.
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time it would not use reason. Next, gradually it would acquire a body in which
it could use reason. By this it already would be more perfect, but still imperfect and on its way, as it were, to a more perfect state, After a while, it would
be separated from the body so that it might move to its proper nature, acquire a greater perfection of the intellect, and experience every mode of being.
However, afterwards, God would unite it to a body so that it might have every
perfection there33.

Alas, such a philosophical fantasy cannot hold since the resurrection is a
gratuitous gift of God, not something we are due by nature. Thus, our intellect
does not rest in its worry about the state of the soul after death.
Yet all philosophical hope is not lost. Staying only within the perspective of
the laws of nature, the natural condition of the soul is to seek some perpetual
end not only for the soul, but also for the composite. The soul’s natural
condition also desires some recompense (retributio) for good and evil acts—for
the composite, not just the soul34. Suárez’s appeal here to the natural sense
that good people should be rewarded and bad people punished can hardly
be called demonstrative, but like the natural desire to reunite with a body, it
is psychologically acute. The question to ask now is where can we find some
support for these bare assertions. The answer to this question takes us back to
Suárez’s initial break with the tradition in ascribing semi-personhood to the
soul itself. The philosophical defense of resurrection would have to be located
in the need to complete the semi-person that exists separated from the soul.
Such completion, though, would be impossible to a separated soul that had no
continuity of personhood. For such a separated soul, being reunited to a body
would constitute a bestowal of personhood, not a completion of personhood.
There seems no compelling reason (as opposed to faith) to hope for a bestowal
of personhood, but the completion of a person seems like exactly the sort of
hope a philosopher as a philosopher might have. By advocating the naturalness
of the soul’s existence both as informing a body and as separate from it, and
by recognizing that the soul is a locus, if not the unique or complete locus,
of personal identity, Suárez has gone a long way to defusing a philosophical
despair over the prospect of the resurrection of the body.
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33
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 9. n. 6, vol. 3: pp. 532-534: «Diceretur enim animam nostram
quasi ab imperfecto ad perfectum procedere; et primum, naturale ei esset ut esset in corpore,
in quo, pro aliquo tempore, non uteretur ratione; deinde [ut] paulatim acquirat corpus
in quo uti possit ratione, in quo iam perfectior est, sed adhuc imperfecta et quasi in via
ad statum perfectiorem; postmodum vero a corpore separatur ut naturalem conditionem
subeat et maiorem intellectus perfectionem acquirat et omnem essendi modum experiatur;
postmodum vero corpori unitur a Deo ut ibi habeat omnem perfectionem suam».
34
Suárez, CDA, d. XIV, q. 9, n. 6, vol. 3: p. 534.

PENSAMIENTO, vol. 74 (2018), núm. 279

pp. 63-74

